Introduction
On Tuesday, 17 March 2020 the Court of Appeal handed down judgment in the (Ground 5) possession claim case of Oshin v The Royal Borough of Greenwich [2020] EWCA CIV 388. Lord Justice Floyd delivered the main judgment of the court, and explained:
- The issue in this appeal is whether the respondent local authority, the Royal Borough of Greenwich, was induced to grant the appellant, Blessing Oshin, a tenancy of 15 Jessup Close, London SE18 (“Jessup Close”), by a false statement knowingly or recklessly made by her. The issue arises in the local authority’s claim for possession against the appellant of Jessup Close, pursuant to Ground 5 of Schedule 2 of the Housing Act 1985. By a decision dated 13 April 2018 Deputy District Judge John Calver (“the DDJ”) held that the respondent had been induced to grant the tenancy by the appellant’s false statement and granted an order for possession. The appellant’s appeal to the County Court at Central London was dismissed by HHJ Saunders by his decision dated 30 August 2018.
The Legislation
Ground 5 of Schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1985 provides (as mirrored in Ground 17 of Schedule 2 of the Housing Act 1988 with regard to assured tenancies):
The tenant is the person, or one of the persons, to whom the tenancy was granted and the landlord was induced to grant the tenancy by a false statement made knowingly or recklessly by—
(a) the tenant, or
(b) a person acting at the tenant’s instigation.
This is a discretionary ground of possession and as such the claimant landlord must show not only that Ground 5 is satisfied but that it is reasonable to make a possession order (s. 84(2)(a)). It will then be for the defendant tenant to argue that any such order should be suspended or postponed on terms (s. 85(2)). In June 2019 I wrote about the public policy aspect of judicial consideration in this area.
The False Statement
Turning back to Oshin, the false statement alleged was described in Floyd L.J.’s judgment thus:
3. In about 1999 the appellant was living with a close friend at 112 Robert Street, London SE18 (“Robert Street”). She had no tenancy at Robert Street, and so applied to the respondent to have her name placed on the housing list. On 2 February 2001 she completed in her own name the respondent’s “Housing Application Form” (“the 2001 form”). The 2001 form has a number of questions requiring responses from an applicant. Question 10 on the form was headed “Immigration Status” and asked:
“Has anyone you have mentioned so far lived outside the United Kingdom in the last 5 years? Please [tick] the correct box.”
4. The appellant ticked the “No” box. This was untrue. The DDJ held that the appellant arrived in the United Kingdom in September 1998 from Nigeria, and that she had therefore lived outside the United Kingdom in the five years prior to the completion of the 2001 form.
5. Underneath the boxes marked “Yes” and “No” the form stated:
“If Yes and an Asylum/Immigration Form has not been already been completed, please ask for one.”
6. The appellant also answered Question 15 on the 2001 form. That question was designed to elicit an applicant’s addresses in the previous five years. She answered by saying that from 1990 to 1999 she had been living in private rented accommodation at 49 Camberwell New Road, London SE5. In the light of the DDJ’s finding that she first came to the United Kingdom in 1998, that statement was also untrue. Her false answer gave the impression that she had been living in the UK for more than 10 years at the date of the 2001 form.
Ms Oshin was granted the tenancy of 112 Robert Street, London SE18 (“Robert Street”), the Jessup Close tenancy agreement then being entered into in 2008, and repeated these falsehoods in 2005 (post Robert Street grant) with regard to her two sons when she advised Greenwich that they were now living with her (having joined her from Nigeria in 2004).
The courts below
A Deputy DJ found that the 2001 falsehoods were material (though not those in 2005 as the 2 sons were minors and would not be tenants of any property offered) and held that it was reasonable to make a possession order. The issue of reasonableness was not contested in the Court of Appeal.
On appeal by Ms Oshin, HHJ Saunders found against her.
Grounds of Appeal
Lewison L.J. granted permission for a second appeal on 2 grounds:
Ground 1 – The false statement induced the grant of the Robert Street tenancy but not the Jessup Close tenancy.
Ground 2 – The false statements did not induce the grant of either tenancy, because the respondent was unaware of the appellant’s immigration status.
Appellant’s arguments
It was argued on behalf of Ms Oshin that the allocation process had closed once the Robert Street tenancy had been granted in 2005, and that the form was of no relevance thereafter and therefore to the 2008 Jessup Close grant of tenancy (when Ms Oshin could no longer be said to be an applicant for housing). Further, it was said that with regard to the 2005 update the information concerning her sons had no impact on the grant of the latter tenancy.
As for Ground 2, it was said that the false statement did not induce the grant of any tenancy as it could not sufficiently conclude whether an applicant was eligible for social housing whatever the answer. It was said that a more direct question as to the applicant’s immigration status was required.
Judicial conclusion
Floyd L.J. did not accept the arguments made on behalf of Ms Oshin, and the appeal was dismissed. Rather he held and maintained (approved by Coulson & McCombe L.JJs):
- Ground One – The 2005 form was an amendment to that made in 2001 and so it was inevitable that Greenwich would consult both in seeking larger accommodation and allocating, ultimately, Jessup Close: para. 18.
- The argument that once a property has been allocated any false statement in an application is no longer operative is simply wrong: para. 20.
- The Deputy DJ was entitled to conclude that the 2001 application played on Greenwich’s mind when allocating the Jessup Close tenancy in 2008: para. 24.
- Ground Two – Greenwich were clearly asking about time out of the UK in the context of immigration status and though the correct answer would not have been determinative as to eligibility for a social housing tenancy it would have required the completion of an Asylum Immigration form to that end: para. 29.
- “I accept that, in order to be material, the false statement must be relevant to whether the applicant is eligible for social housing. That, however, is not the same thing as requiring that the statement be directly determinative of that question. The appellant’s false statements did not mean that she was entitled to social housing, but they still had sufficient materiality to be capable of inducing the local authority to grant her a tenancy when she was not entitled to one. I would therefore reject ground 2 as well.”: para. 31.
Comment
This was an interesting appeal on its facts, albeit robustly dealt with by the Court of Appeal. It confirms that whilst one is looking at the grant of the current tenancy, there can on the right facts remain the position with respect to the grant of an earlier tenancy and the information provided by or on behalf of the tenant for that purpose.
That doesn’t work if a new tenant appears, such as by assignment, as was clear from the Court of Appeal’s judgment in LB Islington v Uckac [2006] 1 W.L.R. 1303.
But here, as Floyd L.J. said at para. 23 of the Oshin judgment:
“In the end, therefore, the question of what induced the grant of the Jessup Close tenancy was a question of fact for the DDJ to decide. The proper approach to such questions was explained in the judgment of Newman J, sitting as a judge of this court, with which Peter Gibson and Sedley LJJ agreed, in Waltham Forest LBC v Roberts [2005] EWCA Civ 940; [2005] H.L.R. 2 at [41] to [43]. The court does not have to decide “what really would have happened”, but whether the false statement had played “… a real and substantial part, though not by itself a decisive part, in inducing the Authority to act”. It had to be “one of the inducing causes”. In considering inducement “it is helpful to start by considering the materiality of the statement”. “A false statement of a material matter is likely to have induced the misrepresentee”.”